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I. INTRODUCTION
Passed in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' was an attempt
by Congress to protect the rights of workers to organize and collectively bargain
with their employers while ensuring that the "free flow of commerce"2 was not
obstructed in the process.3 The NLRA provides that unions and employers may
enter into a union security agreement whereby the union can condition a worker's
employment on being a member of and paying dues to the union or being a non-
union member but paying the equivalent of union dues to the union.4 However,
workers challenged this compulsory unionism because in many cases a large
portion of the dues went to support political or ideological causes with which the
workers disagreed.5 These objectors were successful, and were granted the
remedy of only having to pay an amount that represented the union's cost of
collectively bargaining.6
Other workers objected to paying any money to the union because doing so
would conflict with their religious beliefs. 7 These religious objectors found
success under Title VII, and the courts granted a "charitable substitution" remedy
whereby religious objectors would pay the equivalent of member dues to a
charity in lieu of paying the union.'
The remedies granted to the two types of objectors, secular and religious, are
similar in that both objectors are allowed to not financially support the union in a
way that conflicts with their convictions.9 However, there is an inequality
between the two remedies. The religious objector pays the full equivalent of
union dues out-of-pocket while the secular objector pays a lesser amount
representing only collective bargaining costs.' This Comment argues that this
discrimination is an unreasonable accommodation under Title VII for the
religious objector.
The federal courts have addressed this issue only twice and have reached
opposite conclusions." In Madsen,'2 the court found that under Title VII, it was a
reasonable accommodation to require a religious objector to pay the full amount
1. The Act, as amended, is codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (West 1998).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
5. See infra Part M.A.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
7. See infra text Part II.B.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 67-81.
9. See infra Part I.A & B.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
11. Compare Madsen v. Associated Chino Teachers, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2004) with O'Brien
v. City of Springfield, 319 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 2003).
12. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1175.
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of union dues to a charity and not the lesser amount paid by a secular objector.'3
On the other hand, in O'Brien,4 the court found that under Title VII, it was an
unreasonable accommodation to require a religious objector to pay more to a
charity than his or her secular counterpart is required to pay to the union."
Part II of this Comment discusses the relevant background of the NLRA,
then shifts focus toward the manner in which unions have used member dues to
finance their political and ideological causes, often supporting candidates or
causes that their members would not otherwise support. Part III discusses the
case law that gives secular and religious objectors the right to limit their financial
contributions to their unions. Part IV illustrates how the rights of the two types of
objectors create an inequality in treatment between them. It then discusses the
federal court treatment of this issue in the Madsen and O'Brien cases. Part V
critiques these two cases in light of circuit and Supreme Court interpretations of
Title VII and argues that the O'Brien decision is the better result.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief overview of the NLRA
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act. The impetus
behind the Act was to encourage the process of collective bargaining and thereby
prevent an economic slow down when both organized labor and management
engaged in activity that resulted in industrial strife. 6 In addition, Congress sought
to protect the right of workers to organize and determine who would represent
them in employment negotiations. Effectively, the NLRA provides that
employees may organize as a union and obliges an employer to bargain in good
faith over the terms and conditions of union members' employment.'"
Two statutory provisions of the NLRA are relevant to understanding how the
union serves as the "collective bargaining"' 9 agent for its members. The first is
the exclusive representation provision. Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 159, when a
majority of voting employees in a bargaining unit elect a particular union to
represent them for collective bargaining purposes, that union is certified to be the
exclusive representative of those employees for that purpose. The significance of
this provision is that a union certified through this process "represents all the
workers who voted for it, all the workers who voted against it, and all the
13. Id. at 1181-84.
14. O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d 90.
15. Id. at 106-07.
16. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1998).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 158(d).
19. Collective bargaining generally includes the union dealing with the employer to resolve issues
"concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." See
id. § 152(5) (defining "labor organization" as an organization which exists for these enumerated purposes).
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workers who did not vote." 20 Moreover, individual employees are unable to
negotiate directly with the employer over the terms of employment.2'
The second important provision of the NLRA is the union security provision.22
This provision provides that a union may place a "union security" clause in its
collective bargaining agreement whereby the union and the employer agree that an
employee's employment will be conditioned upon union membership or paying to
the union the equivalent of membership dues.23 In 1963, the Supreme Court held that
despite a union security agreement, an employee need not be a member of the union
as a condition of employment so long as the employee pays the requisite union fees.24
In looking at how the exclusive bargaining and union security provisions relate,
the limited rights of the employee are apparent. An employee represented by a union
cannot discuss or negotiate the terms of his or her employment with the employer
because the union is the only entity that has the right to do So.2' Furthermore, under a
security provision, a worker's very employment is conditioned upon being a member
of the union or paying the equivalent of membership dues and fees to the union.26
Accordingly, some people refer to union security clauses as "forced-unionism
' 27
provisions because an employee must be a union member and pay union fees, unless
the employee is willing to face unemployment.2s
The above provisions fall within the NLRA and are generally applicable to
private sector labor relations outside the airline and railway industriesY.
However, with regard to union security agreements, states may legislate to
20. Charles W. Baird, Cato Institute, The Permissible Uses of Forced Union Dues: From Hanson to Beck
(Cato Policy Analysis No. 174) (July 24, 1992) available at http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=
1034&full=1 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3).
23. Id.; R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Discharge or other Discriminatory Treatment of Employee Pursuant to
Union Security Clause as Within Unfair Labor Practice Provisions of Taft-Hartley Act, 36 A.L.R.2d 630 § 1
(1954).
24. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
25. See supra text accompanying note 20 (illustrating how an employee may be represented by a union
even if the employee was in the minority of voters who rejected the union or did not vote at all). Furthermore,
employees often enter into employment where there is already an exclusive bargaining agent representing the
current employees. Attempting to obviate or change the exclusive bargaining agent is too onerous a task for
many employees to undertake. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(e)(1) (West 1998) (providing that to have the National
Labor Relations Board conduct a secret ballot of the employees to vote whether or not to rescind the authority
of their current union to be their exclusive representative, the employees must obtain petition signatures
consisting of at least of 30% of the employees within the bargaining unit).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
27. Quick v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 231,236 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).
28. See Press Release, Congressman Bob Goodlatte, Fundamental Rights for Every American (March
23, 2001) available at http://www.house.gov/goodlatte/NRTW032301 wc.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (stating that "[c]urrent federal law allows unions to force individuals to pay membership dues to
the union for the simple right of obtaining and keeping a job").
29. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2) (excluding from the definition of employer the United States Government,
state governments and any person subject to the Railway Labor Act). The Railway Labor Act not only governs
railway carriers but also airline carriers. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 181 (West 1986 & Supp. 2004).
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prohibit such agreements from conditioning employment on union membership
or paying the equivalent of union fees.30 These laws are known as "right-to-work"
laws and exist in twenty-two states." These laws allow employees to resign from
union membership and not pay union dues or fees to the union32 while preventing
the union or the employer from discriminating against them because of their non-
membership in the union.33
Employees who do not live in right-to-work states and whose employment is
subject to union-security clauses are required to pay their union dues as a
condition of employment. However, employees often raise questions as to how
unions spend that money in light of the fact that they do not voluntarily give that
31money to the unions.
B. Union Dues and Where they Go
1. Union Income
It is estimated that private sector and some public sector unions receive an
annual income of approximately $19.4 billion dollars.36 Of this $19.4 billion
dollars, $8.5 billion derives from employees who are subject to forced unionism
clauses.37
2. Union Expenditures
Aside from payroll expenses, many union members assume that a large
percentage of their dues covers the cost incurred by the union to collectively
30. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b); Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Las
Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line Inc., 319 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that notwithstanding the
language of section 164(b), which only allowed states to prohibit union security clauses that conditioned
employment on union "membership;" states could also prohibit union security clauses that required employees
to pay an "agency fee" or sum of money equivalent to membership dues and fees).
31. Michael F. Alberti, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Right-to-Work
Provisions, 105 A.L.R.5th 243 § 2 (2003); see National Right to Work Foundation, Right to Work States at
http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited November 11, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(listing the following right-to-work states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming).
32. National Right to Work Foundation, Issue Paper: Employees in Right to Work States at http://www.
nrtw.org/a/rtwempl.htm (last visited February 17, 2005) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
33. Alberti, supra note 31, § 2.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, BIG LABOR: A $19 BILLION-A-YEAR
BUSINESS 1 (June 7, 2004), at http://www.nilrr.org/BigLabor$19%2OBillionAYearBusiness.pdf (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (obtaining this figure based on union receipts as disclosed on U.S. Dep't of
Labor financial forms LM-2 and LM-3).
37. Id.
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bargain on their behalf.38 However, the actual amount that any one union might
spend on collective bargaining is uncertain. For example, the "former Solicitor of
the Department of Labor, states that as much as 80 percent of union dues is used
for non-collective bargaining activities, while union attorneys claim the same 80
percent figure as the amount used for collective bargaining-related expenses."39
The amount unions spend on collective bargaining expenses is not easy to
track because "unions possess the facts and records from which the [union's
total] expenditures can reasonably be calculated,"40 and are therefore typically
accountable only to themselves with regard to those expenses. 4' However, on two
occasions the Supreme Court reviewed union financial records to determine the
actual amount of members' dues that consisted of representation costs and the
portion of dues that consisted of non-representation or political costs. 42 In those
cases, the Court found that seventy-nine percent and ninety percent, respectively,• 41
of the unions' dues went to expenses unrelated to employee representation.
3. Who and What do Unions Support With their Political Expenditures
Unions spend an overwhelming percentage of their political contributions on
Democratic candidates." In spending so much money supporting one political
agenda, it is unavoidable that the political candidates and causes that unions
support are not necessarily those supported by all of their 15.5 
million45
38. See ROBERT P. HUNTER ET AL., MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, THE MICHIGAN UNION
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: A STEP TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 5
(Dec. 2001), available at http://www.mackinac.org/archives/2001/s2001-02.pdf (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining how many union members are now discovering that the funds they
believed were going to represent them are too often being diverted to the union's political operations).
39. KENNETH R. WEINSTEIN & THOMAS M. WIELGUS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, BACKGROUNDER,
How UNIONS DENY WORKERS' RIGHTS 10 (July 18, 1996) available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
GovernmentReform/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=22115 (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
40. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113,
122 (1963).
41. Harry G. Hutchison, Diversity, Tolerance, and Human Rights: The Future of Labor Unions and the
Union Dues Dispute, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 705, 727-28 (2003) (discussing how unions face only minimal
financial disclosure laws and that unions take advantage of this by failing to report accurately their income and
expenses to their members).
42. Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500
U.S. 507 (1991).
43. Hunter et al., supra note 38 at 15.
44. See Center for Responsive Politics, Labor: Long-Term Contribution Trends, at http://www.open
secrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=P (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (showing that in 2004, 87% of union political spending went to Democrats and that, on average, unions
have spent 93% of their political expenditures supporting Democrats over the past fourteen years).
45. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2004 at 2 (Jan.
27, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01272005.pdf (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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members. 6 In fact, in the 2004 presidential election, 38 percent 7 of union
members voted for President Bush even though unions spent more than $180
million trying to unseat him, and the nation's largest union federation, the AFL-
CIO, officially endorsed the Democratic candidate.48
Ordinarily, no problem arises when an individual out of his or her own free
will financially contributes to an organization that spends the money on certain
political or social causes. 49 However, a more troubling situation occurs when an
employee must make contributions to an organization which uses that money to
support causes to which that employee objects. As Thomas Jefferson said, "to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical .... 50
III. A BREAKTHROUGH FOR UNION OBJECTORS
The concept of being a union objector evolved from the compulsory
unionism scheme that forces employees indirectly to support political or
ideological causes with which they disagree.' There are two different roads that
union objectors in non-right-to-work states can take in asserting their right to
withhold financial support of their union. The first road is political objection and
the second road is religious objection. As outlined below, each road is a distinct
path leading to a different remedy.
A. Beck and the Political Objector
As discussed above, unions have funneled hundreds of millions of dollars of
union dues to support Democratic candidates and liberal causes. 2 Understandably,
46. See Lynn Vincent, Dues & Don'ts, WORLD MAG., Nov. 30, 2002 at 17 (relating several stories of
union members who sought to become non-members and withhold their payments when they learned that their
unions were supporting political and ideological causes inapposite of their own beliefs).
47. CNN, Election Results, Full National Exit Poll, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
48. Press Release, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Votes to Endorse Senator John Kerry for President (Feb. 19,
2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr02192004.cfm (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see Leigh Strope, Despite Massive Effort and Spending, Unions Couldn't Deliver
Votes for Kerry, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Nov. 4, 2004 (explaining how union spending in support of
John Kerry is expected to double that of the $90 million spent by the unions to elect Al Gore in 2000).
49. Many unions not only support particular political candidates but also support "social" issues such as
abortion-on-demand and school based sexual health clinics. See Vincent, supra note 46, at 17.
50. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950) (emphasis in original).
51. See Vincent, supra note 46 at 17 (describing the situations faced by some union members when they
tried to stop their union from using their dues to support social causes, such as abortion, homosexuality and
pornography).
52. Big-Labor Pains, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, at A16.
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this use of dues money in a forced-unionism state frustrated "agency fee"53 payers
who did not want to see their money used to support candidates or causes to which
they politically objected.5 In Beck,55 Harry Beck and other employees challenged
the Communication Workers of Americaf's ("CWA") spending of agency fees for
purposes unrelated to collective bargaining.56 Beck and his fellow employees
alleged that CWA's spending of their agency fees on "lobbying, and participating
in social, charitable, and political events, violated [its] duty of fair representation as
required by [section] 8(a)(3) of the NLRA .... .""
In interpreting section 8(a)(3), the Court found that Congress intended union
security clauses to force employees to pay for the cost of collective bargaining
but did not intend to allow unions to force employees to financially support
causes, which they opposed. Accordingly, the Court held that a union may not
charge an agency fee-payer for money spent on non-collective bargaining
activities such as lobbying, social, political and charitable events.59
In short, "Beck makes clear that nonmembers required to pay union fees as a
condition of employment have a right under the NLRA to object and obtain a
reduction of their compulsory payments so that they do not include union
expenses for purposes other than collective bargaining, contract administration,
and grievance adjustment."'
B. The Religious Objector
In contrast to section 8(a)(3), Congress specifically provided for religious
objectors in its amendments to the NLRA.6' Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 169,
53. "Agency fee" refers to an amount of money charged by a union to employees who are subject to a
union security provision but who choose not to become members. Prior to Beck, unions could charge these
"agency fee payers" the equivalent of member dues but after Beck, the agency fee may only represent that
amount of money incurred by the union to collectively bargain on behalf of the employee. See Communication
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
54. Beck, 487 U.S. at 739-40.
55. Id. at 735.
56. Id. at 739-40.
57. Representative Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and the
Issue of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes. 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 352-53 (1998).
58. Beck, 487 U.S. at 751 (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 764 (1961)).
59. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 739-40 (listing those activities that Beck and his fellow employees complained
that CWA could not spend their money on and holding that CWA could not spend their money on such
activities). See also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (arriving at the same result as in
Beck but with respect to the Railway Labor Act).
60. National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Your Legal Rights: Private Sector
Employee, at http://www.nrtw.org/a/al_p.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
61. 29 U.S.C.A. § 169 (West 1998). This provision provides:
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or
teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious
objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations shall not be required to join
or financially support any labor organization as a condition of employment; except that such
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"employees belonging to religious organizations which have historically held
conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations"
cannot withhold paying all of their dues to the union but may be required, "in lieu
of financially supporting the union, [to] pay the equivalent of union dues to a
non-labor charitable organization . ,." Despite this accommodation for
religious objectors, the scope of § 169 is limited in that only members of a "bona
fide religion.., which has historically held conscientious objections" to
financially supporting unions may take advantage of the provision.6
Furthermore, the number of organized religions that officially object to their
members financially supporting unions is insignificant.64 Accordingly,
individuals who do not belong to a particular church or sect that officially objects
to its members supporting unions yet nevertheless object religiously to
supporting a union may not rely on § 169 to withhold their dues.65
However, employees with sincerely held religious beliefs against financially
supporting unions but who are not members of a religion contemplated by § 169
have found success in diverting their dues payments to charities under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Title VII makes it an unlawful employment
employee may be required in a contract between such employees' employer and a labor
organization in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and
initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization charitable fund exempt from taxation
under section 501(c)(3) of Title 26, chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such
funds, designated in such contract or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any
such fund chosen by the employee. If such employee who holds conscientious objections
pursuant to this section requests the labor organization to use the grievance-arbitration
procedure on the employee's behalf, the labor organization is authorized to charge the
employee for the reasonable cost of using such procedure.
62. W. Sherman Rogers, Constitutional Aspects of Extending Section 701(j) of Title Vii and Section 19
of the NLRA to Religious Objections to Union Dues 11 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1985).
63. 29 U.S.C.A. § 169 (emphasis added).
64. See Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185, 187 n.2 (1996) (listing the religions with an established objection to
financially supporting unions; the Seventh-day Adventists, the Amish, the Mennonites, Plymouth Brethren IV,
the National Association of Evangelicals, the Christian Missionary Alliance, the Old German Baptists,
Orthodox Jews, and the Islamic and Zoroastrian faiths).
65. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 751 v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1987) (discussing how an employee could not take advantage of § 169 even though she had sincerely held
religious beliefs based on her personal study of the Bible because she did not belong to a church that
traditionally objected to its members financially supporting unions); Wilson v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir.
1990) (noting that an employee did not qualify for exemption from paying union dues as a religious objector
under § 169 because he was not a member of an organized religious group that historically has held an objection
to its members financially supporting unions).
66. See e.g., Boeing, 833 F.2d 165; McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Nottelson
v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648
F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.
1978); Bums v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Debbie N. Kaminer, Title Vii's
Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an
Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 622 (2000) (explaining how courts have unanimously held
that employees asserting their rights under Title VII to a reasonable accommodation for their religious beliefs to
not financially supporting a union should be allowed to pay an amount equal to their union dues to a charity).
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practice for an employer or labor organization to discriminate against an
employee because of his or her religion. 6 Religion is defined as "all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief., 61 Using the "all aspects of
religious observance" language, it is easy to see why employees have had more
success in diverting their payments to charity under Title VII than under the more
restrictive language of the NLRA which requires that the employee be a member
of a "bona fide" religion which has "historically held conscientious objections"
to joining unions.69 Under Title VII, employees may base their religious objection
upon religious convictions that are separate from any organized religion.7°
Title VII requires that an employer or a union make a reasonable
accommodation to an employee's religious beliefs. 7' While the employer
typically chooses the accommodation, the accommodation must not be
discriminatory . All of the circuit courts that have decided cases involving
employee religious objections to joining or financially supporting a union have
determined that a reasonable accommodation under Title VII is to allow the
employee to withhold the union fees from the union; most commonly, the
withheld fees must be contributed to a mutually agreed upon charity.73
In these cases, the unions typically made two arguments against the
charitable substitution. First, the unions argued that allowing the religious
objector to divert his or her dues to a charity would create an undue hardship by
making that employee a free-rider and thereby discriminate against the non-
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a), (c) (West 2003).
68. Id. at § 2000e(j) (West 2003).
69. See Boeing, 833 F.2d at 169 (discussing how the "protections afforded employees' religious beliefs
are not as broad under [§ 169] as they are under [§ 2000e(j)]").
70. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2004). The Guidelines on Discrimination because of Religion provide that:
In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those
cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include
moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength
of traditional religious views .... The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the
fact that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept such
belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective
employee.
Id. See also Boeing, 833 F.2d at 169 (discussing how the employee's religious opposition to unions qualified
under Title VII even though her church permitted its members to join unions).
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j). See Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1241 (holding that even though 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e(j) on its face applies only to employers, the duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs
extends to unions as well); Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979).
72. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69, 71 (1986) (holding that "unpaid leave is not
a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones").
73. EEOC v. Univ. of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990) (withhold and redirect fees away from
offending union); Boeing, 833 F.2d at 168-69; Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 451; Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1242; McDaniel
v. Essex Int'l Corp., 571 F.2d 338, 343-44 (6th Cir. 1978) and 696 F.2d 34, 36-38 (1982); Anderson, 589 F.2d
at 401-02; Bums, 589 F.2d at 406-07; Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168-70 (5th Cir.1976)
(exemption from payment). See also Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEx. L. REV. 317, 398 (1997) (explaining in detail how the
courts upheld the validity of charitable contributions in lieu of paying dues under Title VII).
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objecting dues paying employees by making them pay higher dues as a result."'
The courts disagreed and found that assumptions and hypothetical facts cannot be
a basis for finding an undue hardship."
Second, the unions argued that allowing the religious objector to divert his or
her dues to charity gives that employee preferential treatment over other
employees in contravention of Title VII's reasonable accommodation provision.76
The Ninth Circuit responded to this argument by finding that the charitable
substitution does not result in preferential treatment because the religious
objector "suffer[s] the same economic loss as the union member employees."'
The union in Tooley v. Martin-Marietta78 took a different path from other unions
and argued that the substituted charity accommodation is unreasonable because it is
inconsistent with the NLRA policy of promoting union shop agreements. 9 The court
disagreed and responded that there was indeed a "tension and conflict" between the
policy in favor of union shop agreements and employees' interest in not being
discriminated against for their religious beliefs but that the reasonable
accommodation provision of Title VII strikes a balance between these competing
interests and that the substituted charity accommodation is consistent with this
balancing of interests.8° Specifically, "[u]nder this accommodation, the union is
entitled to enjoy the benefits of the union shop agreement while the plaintiffs are
entitled to practice in accordance with their religious convictions."8'
IV. THE INEQUALITY IN TREATMENT BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL
OBJECTORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
An employee who objects on political grounds to being a union member and
to financially supporting the union is entitled to pay to the union only that
amount which represents the cost to the union to collectively bargain on his or
her behalf.82 In other words, the political objector pays out-of-pocket to the union
the dues amount minus that portion of dues that do not go toward collective
74. Engle, supra note 73 at 399.
75. Anderson, 589 F.2d at 402; McDaniel, 571 F.2d 338. See also Engle, supra note 73 at 399 (noting
how the other circuits decided the religious objector cases in a similar manner). The term "free-riders" is used to
refer to those "employees who enjoy the benefits of union representation but are unwilling to contribute their
share financially." Buchanan Ingersoll, Sometimes there is a Free Ride, 11 No. 12 Pennsylvania. Empl. Law
Letter 5 (Sept. 2001).
76. Engle, supra note 73 at 399; Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1243 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc., v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) for the proposition that the religious accommodation provision does not allow
preferential treatment of employees by having the employer or union to "incur substantial costs of
accommodation for the benefit of those to be accommodated").
77. Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1243.
78. Tooley, 648 F.2d 1239.
79. Id. at 1242.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
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bargaining, while the religious objector pays out-of-pocket to a charity the entire
dues amount.83 For example, suppose union Y requires $100 per month from its
members in dues but only $60 dollars of those dues goes toward collective
bargaining expenses. A, a political objector subject to a union shop agreement
between his employer and the union, would be required to pay only sixty dollars
to the union. 84 However, B, a religious objector subject to the same agreement as
A, would be required to pay the full one hundred dollars to charity. 5 This
example illustrates the difference between the alternatives available to the
religious and political objectors; both A and B object to being members of and
financially supporting union Y but because B bases his objection on religious
grounds he is out-of-pocket forty dollars every month, or $480 a year more than
his secular counterpart.
This issue has surfaced only twice at the federal district court level and those
courts arrived at opposite resolutions. One court held that requiring religious
objectors to pay more out-of-pocket was a reasonable accommodation while the
other court held that it was not. 
8 6
A. Madsen v. Associated Chino Teachers
In Madsen, the Associated Chino Teachers (ACT) was the exclusive
bargaining agent for teachers employed by the Chino Valley School District.87
The agreement88 between ACT and the school district provided that all teachers
must be either members of ACT and thereby pay member dues, or be agency fee
payers and pay a fee "equivalent to that portion of the membership dues which is
used for representation."89 This representation fee was $484.74 annually, whereas
83. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
84. See supra text accompanying note 60 (discussing how an agency fee payer who objects to the unions
expenditures on other than collective bargaining costs need only pay to the union an amount that reflects the
cost of collective bargaining).
85. See supra text accompanying note 73 (explaining how the religious objector accommodation under
Tide VII is to pay to a charity an amount equivalent to union dues).
86. See Madsen v. Associated Chino Teachers, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2004); O'Brien v. City
of Springfield, 319 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 2003). There was a third and similar case in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Christensen v. Continental Master Executive
Council/Continental Airline Pilots Ass'n, No. H-05-0383 (S.D. Tex. filed Feb. 4, 2005). In that case the
plaintiffs/employees religiously objected to union membership and requested that they be allowed to divert the
amount paid by secular objectors to a mutually agreed upon charity. Instead, the union demanded that these
religious objectors actually pay more to a charity than any other employee is required to pay in dues or fees to
the union. The union eventually agreed to a consent decree in favor of the plaintiffs/employees. See Consent
Decree, Christensen v. Continental Master Executive Council/Continental Airline Pilots Ass'n, No. H-05-0383
(S.D. Tex. filed May 19, 2005) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
87. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
88. This agreement consisted of a collective bargaining agreement and a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). Id. The pertinent agreement governing the membership and dues paying requirements is
contained in the MOU but, for purposes of this discussion, the documents will be referred to as the
"agreement."
89. Id. at 1178-79.
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the regular membership dues were $782.00 annually.9" The agreement also
provided that religious objectors need not join or financially support the union
but instead must pay a sum equal to the membership fee to a charity. 9'
Ms. Madsen was a teacher in the Chino Valley School District who claimed
religious objector status under the aforementioned provision.9' However, she
claimed that she was required to pay to charity only that amount paid by agency fee
payers and not the greater amount paid by regular ACT members.93 According to
her, "[i]t is discriminatory to require a religious objector to pay a greater sum than
that of other agency fee payers" since "fee payers receive a rebate for that portion
of union dues used for ideological and political purposes."94 ACT disagreed
however, and Ms. Madsen accordingly filed a Title VII action alleging religious
discrimination. 95
Specifically, Ms. Madsen argued that the discrimination she faced by not
being allowed to pay the lesser amount was "disparate treatment" as opposed to a
failure by ACT to reasonably accommodate her religious beliefs.96 Under this
theory, she claimed that she was similarly situated to the agency fee payers but
that she, as a religious objector, was being discriminated against by having to pay
$782.00 to charity. 9 ACT argued that the difference in treatment was legitimate
because agency fee payers pay money to the union while religious objectors do
not.98 In response, Ms. Madsen argued that since the religious objector paid no
money at all to the union, it makes no difference to ACT whether the religious
objector pays the lesser amount.99 She further argued that making the religious
objector pay more than the agency fee payer created a scheme whereby an
employee who would otherwise be a religious objector would become an agency
fee payer in order to pay the lesser amount while at the same time allowing the
union to pocket the money that the employee would otherwise donate to
charity.'00
The court, however, disagreed with Ms. Madsen for three reasons. First, the
court said that her position disregarded the policy against free-riders found in
California's Education Employment Relations Act,'0 ' which guided ACT's policy
pertaining to agency fee and religious objectors.' 2 Second, the court said that





95. Id. at 1178.
96. Id. at 1180 n.3.




101. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3540-3549.3 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005).
102. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82.
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because religious objectors cannot be required to pay money to the union, the
only way to treat agency fee and religious objectors similarly would be to require
agency fee payers to pay to a charity.' 3 This, said the court, would have the
undesirable result of placing a significant burden on regular ACT members.
' °4
Thus, requiring agency fee payers to pay only for that which they are receiving in
the form of representation is appropriate and ACT appropriately treated
differently the different groups of objectors as Ms. Madsen requested. °
Finally, the court rejected Ms. Madsen's argument on the basis that Title VII
does not require a labor union to give some employees preferential treatment to
accommodate their religious beliefs.' ° Moreover, the court said that Ms. Madsen was
not even discriminated against in comparison to agency fee payers by having to pay
the greater amount to charity.0 7 As to both these points, the court said that religious
objectors already receive a benefit which members and agency fee payers do not
receive; namely, using the full equivalent of member dues to support a charity "with
which they agree and pay nothing for representational benefits."'' 8 The court
reasoned that no other group had such control over their money and that it was not
"discriminatory to attach a small, ancillary burden to the acceptance of this benefit
available to no other employees."" ° Consequently, the court said that if religious
objectors were allowed to pay only the agency fee amount, they would be receiving
more favorable treatment than any other group of employees because they would be
maintaining control over their money yet paying nothing for representation and Title
VII does not require such favorable treatment. 10
B. O'Brien v. City of Springfield
In O'Brien, the plaintiff, Mr. O'Brien, was a public school teacher subject to a
Massachusetts law which provided that individual teachers could not be compelled to
join a teacher's union but could be compelled to pay to a union a "fair share fee"
which represented the union's cost to collectively bargain on behalf of the individual
teacher."' When Mr. O'Brien learned that his local union, the Springfield Education
Association (SEA), was officially affiliated with the Massachusetts Education
Association (MEA) and the National Education Association (NEA), he requested
that he be allowed to make a charitable substitution in lieu of paying a "fair share
fee""2 to the SEA because the NEA and MEA officially promoted condom





108. Id. at 1183-84.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 93; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West 2004).
112. The terms "agency fee" and "fair share fee" refer to the same concept, paying only the "proportional
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distribution in schools and pro-choice policies, both of which conflicted with his
Roman Catholic beliefs."' The SEA refused Mr. O'Brien's requested accom-
modation and after three unacceptable offers of accommodation by the SEA, Mr.
O'Brien sought relief under Title VII.
114
Mr. O'Brien's desired religious accommodation was exactly what Ms. Madsen
sought: to pay only the "agency fee" or "fair share fee" to charity and not the
greater member dues amount."5 In determining what would be a reasonable
accommodation under Title VII to Mr. O'Brien's religious beliefs, the court
considered the three offers of accommodation previously made by the SEA but
found that each suffered from a fatal defect." 6 Specifically, each offer of
accommodation, though different in some respects, required that Mr. O'Brien pay
more than what a non-union member is required to pay; the full union dues
amount." 7 The court reasoned that because a union may only charge the agency
service fee to a non-member, it is not entitled to charge any amount it wishes to a
religious objector making a charitable substitution. ' 8 Accordingly, the court
concluded, "any demand of a non-union member at the full dues level (as opposed
to the agency service fee) is a per se unreasonable accommodation."' '9
V. A BETrER RESULT: A CRITIQUE OF MADSEN AND O'BRIEN
To understand which court concluded more in line with Title VII as applied to
religious accommodation in the union dues context, an analysis of the reasoning
behind each decision is necessary.
A. A Critique of Madsen
1. The Court's Opinion is Based on an Incorrect Factual Premise
The Madsen court said that religious objectors are treated more favorably than
union members and agency fee payers because they are able to "pay to support
share of the costs of collective bargaining and contract administration." O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
113. Id.at94.
114. Id.at93-97.
115. Compare id. at 97 (stating "O'Brien wishes to pay his current and future agency service fees to
charity") with Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (quoting Ms. Madsen in a letter to her union as saying "I am
also requesting that I pay the same reduced amount as with other fee payers to a charity of my choice. It is
discriminatory to require a religious objector to pay a greater sum than that of other agency fee payers.").
116. O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 105-08. The three offers of accommodation were: (1) O'Brien paying
an amount equal to full union dues to the SEA with the promise that the SEA would not remit any of those
funds to the MEA and NEA; (2) O'Brien would be required to pay the full dues amount to the SEA with a
promise that it would then remit that amount to a charity; and (3) much like offer (2) the SEA would remit the
full dues amount to charity but O'Brien would have to pay other costs not pertinent to this discussion. Id.
117. Id. at 106 (citing MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12, which outlines the amount that a non-
union member is legally obligated to pay)
118. Id.
119. Id. at 106-07.
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ideological activities by contributing to charities of their choice" and thereby
"receive the benefit of supporting ideological causes with which they agree"'20
while paying nothing for representational benefits.'2 ' To support the assertion that
religious objectors pay to support charities of their choice, the court quotes
California Government Code section 3546.3.122 In quoting section 3546.3, the court
says that religious objectors "may be required, in lieu of a service fee, to pay sums
equal to such service fee... to a... charitable fund... chosen by the
employee.' 23 What the court omitted in quoting section 3546.3 is that employees
may choose a charity of their choice only if the union failed to designate three
charities in the union security agreement, in which case, the employee must choose
one of the three charities designated by the union.
12 4
The omitted statutory language is material not only because it misleads the
reader into believing that religious objectors always are allowed to choose a
charity of their choice and therefore allowed to "support[] ideological causes
with which they agree, '  but more importantly, as applied to this case, it is
simply wrong. The court says that Ms. Madsen was allowed to choose a charity
of her choice.2 6 In fact, Ms. Madsen was not allowed to choose a charity of her
choice, but had to choose from three charities designated by ACT. 127 Admittedly,
being able to choose among three charities designated by a union is a choice but
it is no more a meaningful choice than if the federal government said that all
citizens had a choice of which car to purchase so long as the car was a Ford,
Chevy or Buick. Thus, the court's omission of material statutory language and
facts is a misapplication of the relevant statutory law and of the facts.
120. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 1184.
122. Id. at 1182.
123. Id. (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3546.3) (omission in original).
124. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3546.3 (West 1995), reading in pertinent part:
Any employee who is a member of a religious body whose traditional tenets or teachings
include objections to joining or financially supporting employee organizations shall not be
required to join, maintain membership in, or financially support any employee organization as
a condition of employment; except that such employee may be required, in lieu of a service
fee, to pay sums equal to such service fee either to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization,
charitable fund exempt from taxation under Section 501(c) (3) of Title 26 of the Internal
Revenue Code, chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such funds, designated in
the organizational security arrangement, or if the arrangement fails to designate such funds,
then to any such fund chosen by the employee. (emphasis added).
125. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
126. See id. at 1184 (discussing how if Ms. Madsen was able to pay only the $484.74 to a charity of her
choice rather than the $782.00 then she would be receiving preferential treatment).
127. See Chino Valley Unified School District, Memorandum of Understanding at 2 (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the American Cancer Society, Mt. Baldy United Way, and the American
Heart Association as the charities available to a religious objector within ACT).
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2. The Circuit Courts Have Rejected the Arguments Advanced by the
Madsen Court
The charitable substitution for religious objectors under Title VII has been held
valid in every circuit to decide the issue.'28 Madsen is unique among these cases
because it is one of two cases litigated in federal court where a religious objector
sought to pay to a charity the agency fee amount and not the equivalent of union
member dues. However, the arguments advanced by the Madsen court in support of
its decision are the same arguments that were rejected by the circuit courts when
unions argued that the Title VII charitable substitution was invalid.
First, the court said that ACT's membership policy was consistent with the
California Education Employment Relations Act (EERA) by reducing the possibility
that other union members would view religious objectors as "free-riders.' ' 29 Along
this same line of reasoning, the court went on to say that it was appropriate for ACT
to encourage those members who do not religiously object to union membership but
who object to some union expenses, to be agency fee payers so as not to make dues
paying members bear the burden of paying for the representational benefits of the
religious objectors.130 In arriving at these conclusions, the court was taking the
EERA's policy position that amicable employee-employer relations are best effected
by compulsory union membership and that exceptions to union membership should
be limited. 3' This policy position raises the question of whether it is appropriate for a
federal court to favor a state labor policy over Title VII.
Two circuits say it is not appropriate to do so for two different reasons. First, in
McDaniel,'32 the Sixth Circuit compared the national labor law policy with Title VII
and concluded, "there has been no national policy of higher priority than the
elimination of discrimination in employment practices."' 33 Thus, in a head-to-head
challenge, the policy of Title VII prevails. Second, the Ninth Circuit in Boeing'3 4 said
that federal labor law and Title VII provide: (1) separate and independent rights and
(2) Title VII is in no way limited by the NLRA. 13 If the rights are separate and
independent, then it is improper for the Madsen court to interpret the EERA policy as
a limit on Title VII remedies.
128. Univ. of Detroit, 904 F.2d at 335; (withholding and redirecting fees away from offending union);
Boeing, 833 F.2d at 168-69; Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 451; Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1242; McDaniel, 571 F.2d at 343-
44 and 696 F.2d at 36-38; Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401-02; Bums, 589 F.2d at 406-07; Cooper, 533 F.2d at 168-
70 (allowing exemption from payment to unions on religious grounds).
129. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
130. Id. at 1183.
131. Id. at 1181-82.
132. McDaniel, 571 F.2d 338.
133. Id. at 343.
134. Boeing, 833 F.2d 165.
135. Id. at 169-70 (stating that the "rights created by Title VII are independent and separate of the rights
created by the NLRA" and how even though the rights under Title VU may be broader than those of the NLRA,
this simply reflects Congress's desire to "more thoroughly eradicate discrimination in the workplace").
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Essentially, the Madsen court was subtly using the policy of the EERA to
read into Title VII a limitation on the rights of religious objectors.'3 6 Every
federal district court which has overtly done this with respect to the NLRA - by
rejecting the charitable substitution at the full dues amount and requiing
religious objectors to pay fees to the union - has been reversed on appeal.'37 With
this in mind, had Ms. Madsen asked only to divert the full amount of her union
dues to charity and the court maintained that the EERA policy prevented her
from doing so, the court most certainly would have been reversed on appeal."'
Yet the court does not explain why the same arguments that denied religious
objectors the charitable substitution, which the circuit courts later rejected,
should now be sound arguments in denying religious objectors a charitable
substitution at the agency fee amount.3 9 In sum, the Madsen decision is weak
precedent because it relied on arguments that failed at the appellate level with
respect to a substantially similar issue, yet offered no reason why those
previously failed arguments should now be successful.
3. The Madsen Decision Diverges from Title VII Jurisprudence with
Respect to the Union Dues Cases
In one of its final arguments, the Madsen court cites Trans World Airlines,
Inc., v. Hardison'40 for the proposition that "Title VII does not require an
employer to give preferential treatment to some employees to accommodate their
religious beliefs.' 4' The court found that by allowing Ms. Madsen to pay the
agency fee amount to a charity instead of the full dues amount, ACT would be
treating her more favorably "than any other group of employees because she
would receive the benefits of representation and yet maintain control of the use
of her money" by keeping the nearly $300 difference and supporting a charity
136. See Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1182-84 (discussing how ACT's policy conforms with the EERA
policy against free-riders while later discussing how Ms. Madsen's request conflicts with that policy and that
Title VII does not support her request).
137. EEOC v. Patrick Henry Educ. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 670, 677 (N.D. Ohio 1990), vacated, 909 F.2d
1483 (6th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Univ. of Detroit, 701 F. Supp. 1326, 1340-41 (E.D. Mich. 1988), rev'd, 904 F.2d
331 (6th Cir. 1990); Bums v. Southern Pac., 11 FEP Cases 1441, 1446 (D. Ariz. 1976) (waiver of membership
and union participation requirements a reasonable accommodation), rev'd, 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978);
McDaniel v. Essex, 14 FEP Cases 807, 808-09 (W.D. Mich. 1976) (eliminating requirement of formal
membership and only requiring "financial core" membership is sufficient), rev'd, 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978);
Cooper v. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (paying for collective bargaining costs
does not violate beliefs), rev'd, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976).
138. See supra note 137 (listing the cases in which the circuit courts reversed the lower courts' decision
to reject the charitable substitution).
139. See Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-1184 (examining the opinion will reveal a distinct lack of
precedent with regard to charitable substitution accommodation for religious objectors).
140. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
141. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84
(1977)).
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with which she agreed. 4 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that "[t]here can be
no support under Title VII for Ms. Madsen's request for preferential treatment,
i.e., to pay to a charity an amount lower than the equivalent of ACT membership
dues.' 43
While it is true that Hardison stands for the proposition that Title VII does
not require employers to give preferential treatment to religious employees,' 44 the
Madsen court's application of this rule is misplaced in light of circuit precedent
with respect to union dues cases.
The courts in most religious accommodation cases have taken the approach
that a reasonable accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs should not
discriminate against other employees by treating the religious employee more
favorably. 45 For example, granting an employee an accommodation that would
allow him to observe the Sabbath, and therefore not work Saturdays, would be an
unreasonable accommodation because it would discriminate against more senior
employees who would otherwise have the first choice for job shifts and would
presumably choose not to work on Saturdays.
46
However, the religious accommodation union dues cases "stand in sharp
contrast"'' 47 to other employment religious accommodation cases. 148 In these cases, the
courts have looked not to whether allowing an employee the charitable substitution
would discriminate against other employees while treating the religious objector
more favorably, but "have focused on the equal burden 'suffered' by union members
and [religious objectors].' ' 9 Specifically, even though exempting religious objectors
from mandatory union dues is necessarily discriminatory with respect to other dues
paying employees, it is not necessarily unreasonable because the religious objectors
"suffer the same economic loss as... union member employees."'' 0
With this distinction between union dues religious accommodation cases and
the non-union dues religious accommodation cases in mind, it is easy to see how
the Madsen court's analysis is flawed. The Madsen court discusses how union
members and agency fee payers are burdened by having to pay "higher than
142. Id. at 1184.
143. Id. at 1183.
144. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 84; see also Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1243 (stating that "[t]he religious
accommodation provisions [of Title VII] do not authorize preferential treatment of employees"); but see James
M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 525, 535 (2004) (discussing how "despite the limits announced by the Supreme Court in Hardison
and Ansonia, Title VII still requires employers to provide religion with 'preferential treatment' in 'some
circumstances."').
145. Engle, supra note 73, at 398.
146. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
147. Engle, supra note 73, at 398.
148. See generally id. at 398-406 (distinguishing between the union dues religious accommodation cases
and other religious accommodation cases such as cases dealing with accommodations for Sabbath observance,
holiday observance wearing beards and religious garb).
149. Id. at 398.
150. Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1243; see Engle, supra note 73, at 398.
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proportionate representation fees" because religious objectors are able to divert
their dues to charity.'5 ' The court also discusses how religious objectors would
receive favorable treatment by paying the same amount paid by agency fee
payers.'52 In making these discrimination and preferential treatment arguments in
support of its decision, the Madsen court erred because it failed to see the
distinction between the non-union dues religious accommodation cases, where its
arguments prevail, and the union dues religious accommodation cases where the
focus is on the equal burden suffered by the union members and religious
objectors. Thus, by failing to see this distinction, the Madsen court has supported
its holding on reasoning that is misplaced and without precedent in the union
dues context.'
53
4. The Outcome had the Madsen Court not Diverged from the Appropriate
Precedent
Because the Madsen case is a union dues religious accommodation case, the
proper inquiry to determine if Ms. Madsen should be allowed to pay the agency
fee amount instead of the union member amount, is whether she would suffer the
same economic loss as other employees.'54 Admittedly, Ms. Madsen would not
suffer the same economic loss as ACT members by diverting only the $484.74
agency fee amount to charity because the members have to pay $782.00 to ACT.
However, if the "equal burden" comparison is made between the two groups of
objectors, religious objectors and agency fee payers, then religious objectors and
agency fee payers most certainly share in the same economic loss since both pay
$484.74. Under this analysis, Ms. Madsen's request to pay the agency fee amount
is a reasonable accommodation.
Of course, why should the "equal burden" comparison be made between
religious objectors and agency fee payers and not between religious objectors and
union members? The reason the former comparison should be made is because of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ansonia.
5
1
In Ansonia, the Supreme Court considered whether a school board's policy
of only giving unpaid leave for an employee to observe holy days beyond the
paid leave already provided for religious observance was a reasonable
accommodation.5 6 The Court found that such a policy was reasonable.'5 7 The
151. Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
152. Id.at 1184.
153. See Engle, supra note 73, at 398-99 (explaining how the union dues cases present a sharp contrast
to other religious accommodation cases because the courts have rejected the disparate treatment arguments
normally advanced in the religious accommodation cases but have instead looked to the "equal burden" suffered
by religious objectors and other union members).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 147-150.
155. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
156. Id. at 70.
157. Id.
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Court noted, however, that "unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation
when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. ... Such an
arrangement would display a discrimination against religious practices that is the
antithesis of reasonableness."'58
Just as the Court in Ansonia found that it would be discriminatory and
therefore unreasonable to make paid leave available for all but religious
purposes,59 so too is it discriminatory and therefore unreasonable not to allow
religious objectors to pay the agency fee amount when it is available to any
employee who secularly objects to joining and financially supporting the union."6
Thus, in doing the "equal burden" comparison, as is appropriate in the union dues161
cases, it is necessary to compare the economic loss suffered by the religious
objectors and the agency fee payers.'6 2 To conclude otherwise and compare the
economic loss suffered by the religious objectors and the union members would
necessarily "display a discrimination against religious practices' ' 63 because the
option of paying the agency fee amount would be available to all but religious
objectors."6
B. A Critique of O'Brien
The O'Brien court failed to rely on much, if any, union dues religious
accommodation precedent in reaching its conclusion.' 65 That is not to say,
however, that the O'Brien court was without authority. In reaching the
conclusion that it is unreasonable to charge religious objectors more than the
agency fee, the court relied on Massachusetts labor law proscribing unions from
charging non-union employees anything more than an agency service fee.'
66
According to the court, because religious objectors are non-members, "[a]t most,
the union can levy an amount only equal to the agency service fee."' 167 Therefore,
"any demand of a non-union member at the full dues level (as opposed to the
158. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
160. See Madsen, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (illustrating how agency fee payers objections may be based
on a number of things secular grounds including ideological and political convictions that diverge from those of
the union).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 147-150.
162. See supra text accompanying note 158 (outlining the decision in Ansonia where the Court held that
it is unreasonable to provide a benefit to all employees except those seeking the benefit for religious purposes).
163. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 71.
164. See id. (discussing how it is unreasonable and therefore discriminatory under Title VII to provide
paid leave for all but religious purposes).
165. See O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07 (concluding that "any demand of a non-union member at
the full dues level (as opposed to the agency service fee) is a per se unreasonable accommodation" without
citing precedent in support of this conclusion).
166. Id. at 106; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West 2004).
167. O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
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agency service fee) is a per se unreasonable accommodation,' 68 presumably
because it violates Massachusetts labor law.' 69
While the O'Brien court interpreted Massachusetts labor law and did not overtly
rely on Title VII, its holding nonetheless has a nationwide application. The
Massachusetts law in question provides that non-union employees must pay an
agency fee to the union. 70 This agency fee amounts only to those costs that are
"germane"' 7' to the union's collective bargaining expenditures and not costs
associated with political or ideological expenses.' This law codifies the holding in
Beck 73 where the Supreme Court found that non-union employees who were
otherwise compelled to pay fees to a union could only be charged for those costs
associated with collective bargaining. 74 Moreover, in interpreting the Massachusetts
law, the O'Brien court reiterated what the Supreme Court said in Beck, that unions
were not "free to exact dues equivalent from nonmembers in any amount they
please"; 75 instead, they may only charge "those fees necessary to finance collective-
bargaining activities.' 76
Thus, because the Massachusetts labor law at issue in O'Brien codifies the
Supreme Court's decision in Beck and because the O'Brien court's reasoning in
interpreting Massachusetts law is parallel to that used in Beck, its decision is not
limited to Massachusetts law but is applicable nationwide.
If, as the Supreme Court said and the O'Brien court reiterated,177 unions are
not free to charge nonunion employees (such as agency fee payers) any amount
they wish but are limited to charging nonunion employees only for collective
bargaining expenses,' 78 then it necessarily follows that unions cannot demand that
religious objectors ( who are also nonunion employees) pay more than the agency
fee amount to charity since the unions did not have a right to demand any more
from the religious objectors in the first place.
79
168. Id. at 106-07 (emphasis in original).
169. Id. at 107.
170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West 2004).
171. Id. § 12(4).
172. Id. § 12.
173. Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
174. Id. at 762-63.
175. Id. at 759.
176. Id. at 762-63; see O'Brien, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (stating that "[a] union ... is not entitled to
charge whatever amount it wishes to someone making a charitable substitution: At most, the union can levy an
amount only equal to the agency service fee...").
177. See supra text accompanying note 175.
178. See supra text accompanying note 176.
179. See supra text accompanying note 174.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The union dues cases are contentious because unions have a strong and
legitimate desire to ensure that employees pay their fair share for the benefit of
collective bargaining. '° On the other hand, both religious and secular objectors
have just as strong a desire and right not to support financially an organization
when doing so would conflict with their beliefs.' In settling this conflict, the
courts have favored the union objectors over the unions.'82 However, the remedies
fashioned by the courts for the religious and secular objectors differ such that the
religious objector pays more out-of-pocket than his or her secular counterpart.'83
In determining whether such a scheme is a reasonable accommodation under
Title VII, the two district courts to decide the issue reached opposite
conclusions. '84 One court misapplied the applicable precedent and policy to
determine that Title VII did not require the union to make the religious objector
pay to a charity the same amount paid by a secular objector.'85 The other court
used reasoning similar to that used by the Supreme Court to resolve a closely
related issue, and concluded that it is an unreasonable accommodation under
Title VII to require a religious objector to pay more to a charity than what a
secular objector is required to pay to the union. 86 Thus, the correct result appears
to be allowing the religious objector to pay only that amount to a charity that his
or her secular counterpart pays to the union, not the entire member dues amount.
Moreover, in enacting Title VII, the fact that Congress found "there [to be]
no national policy of higher priority than the elimination of discrimination in
employment practices,"'187 further bolsters the conclusion that religious objectors
should not have to pay more than their secular counterparts because it is
necessarily discriminatory to allow employees to pay the agency fee amount for
all but religious purposes.1
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